

QUO VADIS EUROPEAN UNION? THE CORE, PERIPHERIES AND THE PUBLIC OPINION

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Abstract: The paper provides an analysis of the public opinion in the enlarged European Union (EU) on the 2004 Treaty on European Constitution. The constitution project was an attempt to consolidate current stage of deepening of the European integration process. Public opinion and mass interest articulations of national polities are central to studies on the European integration process. The EU is conceptualised in this paper in terms of an inter-state confederal consociational system that is lacking a new well-integrated supra-national European polity. Macro-geographical structure of the current EU is examined in order to derive basic explanatory assumptions that assess the current fragmentation of the EU electorate in 25 national polities. The differentiation across the enlarged EU in the public opinion opposing the draft of EU constitution (Eurobarometer 62) is explained with the help of structural and public opinion variables. Statistical explanatory analysis (LISREL procedure) of the November 2004 articulations of the public opinion opposing the draft of EU constitution shows (i) the importance of both opinions on globalisation and the post-materialist value orientation, and (ii) the significance of the lack of trust in the EU. Further, it appears that populations in the EU periphery (new Member States) did not tend to oppose the draft of the EU constitution. However, the analysis shows emerging public political opinion cleavages across the enlarged European Union and indicates emerging complexities of core – periphery patterns in the continent.

Key words: European Union, public opinion, constitution, core, periphery

1. INTRODUCTION

"Our conclusions as historian, political scientist and geographer have one thing in common: a caveat not to forget the limitations of human nature and the inertia of basic human values, as we live through an era of dramatic and unprecedented changes in technical range. Depending on disciplinary background, we may emphasize different aspects of human reach, be it identity, democratic values or sense of place. But we do agree that mental structures can prove to be barriers to rapid technological and organizational change". (Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist, 2000, Organizing European Space, page 188.)

The May 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) has been a historical, political and organizational change that has importantly modified the institutional and geographical character of the continent. In October 2004, the representatives of the twenty-five EU member states (EU25) signed the draft of the treaty establishing a constitution for the EU. It seemed that the proposed draft can replace the old Treaty of Rome of 1957 that established the European Economic Community and Treaty of Maastricht that instituted the European Union. In short, the draft of EU constitution was intended to realise a further deepening of the European integration process (Jacobs, 2005). But, simultaneously, there have also emerged significant uncertainties about the nature of the European integration that were indicated in changing public opinion across the EU25. The above quotation from the book written by the three Swedish writers rightly highlights the significance of mental structures that are often barriers to changes in organisation and techniques taking place in the process of European integration. Accordingly, this paper provides an interpretation of the current stage of the European integration process through the lens of the public opinion in the twenty-five countries of the enlarged European Union on the draft constitution of the Union. The public opinion and mass interest articulations are central to studies on the European integration, because they provide an important feedback implying often barrier effects from the electorates on governing political elites of the democratic countries concerned.

There emerged in 2004 and 2005 considerable public opinion opposing the draft EU constitution in a number of old and new member states. Importantly, there came contradictory results in referendums on the draft held in some of old member states of the EU15. On the one hand, voters in Spain supported the draft of EU constitution in February 2005 with a huge majority of 76.7 percent. Also voters in Luxembourg were in July 2005 in favour of the draft with a support of 56.5 percent. On the other hand, however, voters in France went to referendum polls in May 2005 and rejected the draft of EU constitution with 54.8 percent. In June 2005, also the Dutch referendum resulted in a huge rejection of the draft with 61.6 percent. These two rejections showed again the importance of the feedback process going in political articulation processes from the electorates to the governing political elites of the member states and expressing dissatisfaction with the general conduct of the national political elites. Other five old member states and five new member states ratified the draft in their respective parliaments before the summer of 2005. These contradictory results are significant and indicate that their explanation must necessarily be complex and needs to take into account the increased heterogeneity of the EU brought in by the enlargement with ten new member states. Moreover, these contradictory results also suggested that the public opinion in the different countries was more about the societal context of the attempted institutional deepening of the EU25 than about the text of the draft of EU constitution itself. In other words, it seems therefore that differentiations in various socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances in the set of EU25 must be examined whether they have important effects on the differentiation in the support or rejection of the draft. Accordingly, it is necessary to use the opportunity provided by the November 2004 Eurobarometer survey held in the EU25. The survey allows for a complex examination of the differentiation in the public opinion opposing the draft constitution in a larger explanatory context of structural economic conditions and public opinion orientations in the set of the twenty-five countries. One can indicate the importance of both the inertia of basic mass values and the emerging cleavages and uncertainties in the public opinion on the European integration across the enlarged EU. The analysis can also show emerging

complexities of the core – periphery patterns in the current organisation of European space.

Obviously, the far-reaching post-war geopolitical and geo-economic fragmentation of the map of Europe and the divide of the Iron Curtain has complicated the evolution of European unifying processes and contributed to the current core-periphery interactions in the continent (Dostál and Hampel, 1996). However, with Emerson (1998), Preston (1997), van Gerven, (2004), Cerutti (2005) and many other observers of the European integration process, one has to recognize that only the EU has to be assessed as a key institutional and organisational vehicle able to make the dynamics of European integration persistent and strong. The basic geopolitical and geo-economic organisation of the continent in a historical core of the EU, its old and new peripheries (i.e. Mediterranean and post-communist countries) is undergoing significant changes. Moreover, it is also clear that the EU has appeared to provide crucial incentives for pursuing in European countries of the former Soviet-dominated orbit the post-communist transformation by general modernising institutional principles of the West (cf. Dostál, 1998; Dostál and Markusse, 2001; 2004). In brief, the EU membership has required qualitative regime adaptations and the establishment of the Western-styled institutional arrangements and compatibility with Western political and economic standards of democracy and market economy. The Copenhagen European Council meeting of June 1993 established three general criteria of the EU for evaluation of accession candidates (i) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for a protection of minorities, (ii) existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU, and (iii) ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (EC, 2000, 9-10; Mayhew, 1998). In other words, these introductory points make clear that analytic efforts concerned with processes of European integration has to be focused on two basic questions. First, there is the question to what extent is the integrative project of the national political elites, as expressed in the draft EU constitution, supported by some sense of European political community in the public opinion of the old and new EU member states. Second, there is the question whether the differentiation in the opposing opinion on the draft constitution in the set of twenty-five EU countries can be explained in a larger explanatory context of structural economic and social conditions and public opinion orientations of the countries concerned. A larger context enabling to indicate (i) importance of inertia of basic mass values, and to assess (ii) emerging cleavages and uncertainties in the public opinion on the European integration process across the enlarged EU.

Accordingly, the paper is structured as follows. Second section focuses on complexities of the current core-periphery patterns and highlights the lack of a European polity formation. Third section is concerned with statistical explanation of differences in opposing public opinion in the set of twenty-five EU countries. Finally, in the last section there are drawn major conclusions resulting from the analytic explanatory effort and also provided a key reflection on the emerging political cleavages and uncertainties in the core-peripheries patterns in current European space.

2. COMPLEXITIES OF A CONFEDERAL CONSOCIATION: LACKING A EUROPEAN POLITY FORMATION AND CURRENT CORE-PERIPHERY PATTERNS

Already Deutsch and his colleagues remarked in 1957 that the term "union" appears to be an attractive label because of its ambiguity. It conveys to some the meaning of federation, confederation to other, or close alliance among independent states to yet others. Given the focus of this paper, it is interesting to note that Deutsch and his associates meant by integration "the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population" (1957, 5). Obviously, the public opinion and mass interest articulations on the European integration process reflect this ambiguity. Therefore, it is necessary to add another definition that gives also a strong emphasis to the need of an effective formation of a new supra-national European polity that can provide a strong basis for the European integration process. Accordingly, Christiansen defines integration as "creation of a new polity bringing together a number of different constituent parts (member states)" (2001, 580). This short, but clear definition is useful, because it addresses one key characteristic of the current EU: the importance of the lack of a well-integrated European polity.

2.1. The European Union as a confederal consociational system

The significance of the lack of well-integrated supra-national European polity can be highlighted through comparison of three basic approaches attempting to highlight the key characteristics of the EU (Taylor, 1991; Costa and Magnette, 2003; Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist, 2000; Christiansen, 2001; Schmidt, 2002). Two traditional approaches have had the greatest impact on the debates concerned with the character of the European integration: the supranational approach and the intergovernmental approach (see Table 1).

As a result of the long-term cumulative institutional development of the European Communities (EC) and the EU since the 1950s (i.e. since the Treaty on European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 and the 1957 Treaty of Rome), however, there gradually emerged a system of institutions and procedures of the current EU that can also be characterised as a confederal consociational system (see also Taylor, 1991; Chrysochoou, 1997; Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist, 2000, 124-125). This confederal consociationalist approach provides more fertile basis for relevant interpretations of the current European integration process than the two traditional approaches summarised in Table 1. The use made of the notion of confederal consociation system is highlighting what has been happening in the EU over a long period. The term "confederal" refers to the institutional structure and procedural system enabling the member nation-states both to protect their vital interests by eventual use of a veto and by building consensus to achieve a certain unity of goals. The political elites elected in the member state represent the states in words of Dahrendorf as a "cartel of elites" (Taylor, 1991, 110) operating in the institutional structure and procedural system of the EU. Considering the term "consociation", it is necessary to stress its reference to processes of co-operative joint decision-making of national representatives at the EU level. There are the well-known defining consociational characteristics:

1. segmental autonomy (sovereignty) of member states,
2. government (i.e. European Commission) of a compact of political elites of the member states,
3. proportional representation in the central EU institutions (in accordance with a certain proportion to population size of member states), and importantly,
4. a right of mutual veto (see further the notion of consociational system in Lijphart, 1979).

Table 1 Three approaches to the European Union

| Supranational approaches | Intergovernmentalist approaches | Confederal con-sociationalist approach |
|---|--|--|
| Integration resulting in the EU is a gradual process | Integration is basically a series of bargaining processes among members states | Institutional structure and procedural system enabling member states both to protect their vital interests by consensus and to achieve a certain unity of goals |
| Supranational institution of the EU are political actors in their own right | Supranational institution of the EU assist and facilitate negotiations among member states | Segmental autonomy of member states, governments of compact of political elites of member states |
| There is emerging a new polity above the member state level | The EU provides a framework for the execution of inter-state politics by different means | Proportional representation in central EU institutions and qualified right of mutual veto |
| Integration is in part driven by institutional dynamics | Bargain processes reflect national interests of the member states | Territorial boundaries of member states delineate segmental boundaries of their populations and national political elites |
| Supranational law of the EU provide constrains for policies and decision-making of members states | Supranational laws are reflecting the interests of the most powerful states | Cultural systems of individual members states defined as the subjective systems of institutions, beliefs and values; there is not emerging a new well-integrated European polity |

In the case of the EU, the territorial boundaries of the member states delineate the segmental boundaries of their populations and national political elites. Significantly, the term "segmental" also conveys the notion of a cultural system of an individual member state. Such a cultural system can be described as "the subjective system of a society's institutions: the beliefs, values and knowledge, and skills that have been internalized by the people of a given society" (Inglehart, 1997, 15). Population proportionality between the member states serves the EU as the fundamental allocation standard of votes in some key institutions. The approach of consociationalism gives particular emphasis to the view that the EU provides the means by which the intra-national dominance of political elites representing the interests of the member states can be enhanced by managerial control over the European integration process at the supra-national level. The European Council and the Council of Ministers are the key institutions for inter-elite accommodation enabling consensus-building at the leadership level of the member states (see also Taylor, 1991; Costa and Magnette, 2003; Chrysochoou, 2000). The relationships between the two Councils and the European Commission appear in the confederal system of EU institutions and procedures to be the core of the decision-making. Finally, given the major task of this paper to make an analysis of the public opinion across the EU25, it is also important to emphasise that the confederal consociational system of the current EU

is characteristically not based on a common electorate (see also Duchesne and Frogner, 1995). Effective formation of a well-integrated European polity is lacking, because the electoral representation process of the European Parliament is primarily linked to political affairs of the individual member states and rooted in territorial cleavages among the nation-states. The strength of the interpretation of the EU as a confederal consociation system is that it is readily connected to the empirical reality of contemporary European integration. The EU is a compound system of distinct culturally and politically delineated units that are bound together by treaties in a consensually arranged system of institutions and procedures. They form a compact of states for specific purposes, without losing their national identity or resigning their basic nation state sovereignty to a higher central authority (see also Rosamond, 2000, 148-151).

2.2. Current complex core-periphery patterns

It is necessary to reiterate that the draft constitution did not seem to change importantly the basic institutional balance between a dispersed system of democracies formed currently by the constituent twenty-five member states and the existing confederal consociational compact of the EU institutions and procedures (see further Jacobs, 2005). However, the considerable opposition of the public to the draft constitution has shown that current participation in the European integration process poses serious challenges and problems to the nation-states. There is a general "integration dilemma" that is in particular salient to smaller states, i.e. the difficult trade-off between influence seeking and autonomy protection. The political elites of the nation-states confront questions of reactions of national electorates to the European integration process. Therefore, macro-geographical structure of the current EU and its enlarged periphery must be examined in order to derive basic explanatory assumptions concerning the emergence of negative attitudes of the electorates towards the draft constitution in the countries concerned.

There are taking place significant changes in current core-periphery patterns in the enlarged EU of twenty-five members. The post-war economic boom brought about nearly full employment and enabled expansion of a welfare system across most of the fifteen old member states of the current EU. The era of Fordist industrialism brought a long period of economic prosperity and significant decrease in poverty in most of the old member states (Rodríguez-Pose, 2002). Since the 1970, however, the processes of economic restructuring, post-industrial development, globalisation and European market integration led to important shifts the core-periphery patterns at the inter-state level in the EU9, the EU12 and the EU15 (see also Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004, 242ff). The national economies and societies of the member states have entered the era of post-industrial development. Many member states witnessed a rise of structural unemployment levels. Some member states tackled high unemployment rates through liberalisation of labour markets like the United Kingdom, some other member states appeared more reluctant to follow such welfare state restructuring policies. These economic shifts and socio-economic policies have shaken in most of the old EU member states the basis of the established economic, social and political arrangements (see also Swank, 2002). Structural reforms to welfare states and deregulation of labour markets remain the key competence of the individual national governments. The EU large core countries of the euro-area Germany, France and Italy all suffer from high unemployment and slow economic growth, seemingly caused in part by high taxes and overly regulated labour

markets (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005). Moreover, the low economic growth is associated in some of the old member states with high government debt and government deficit. This unfavourable combination of economic circumstances is especially a difficult political issue in the 12 euro-zone countries. Because in particular the 1992 criteria for the euro-zone of the Maastricht Treaty and the 1996 rules of the Stability and Growth Pact supplemented to the Treaty, stipulate explicit thresholds for national public debt not to exceed 60 percent of GDP and for national budget deficit not to exceed 3 percent of GDP, except when authorised in exceptional circumstances (Treaty of Maastricht, article 109j, and protocols). Since the signature of the Treaty in 1992, these criteria have had a significant impact on the stabilisation policies of all EU member states and led to efforts of the national governments to converge on sounder public finance and price stability.

Interestingly, in most of the new member states forming the enlarged periphery of the EU since May 2004, the current economic situation is different and indicating that traditional core-periphery patterns tend to change in the EU25. The economies of the new member states have gone growing, roughly two to four times as fast as the euro-zone average growth. Moreover, the May 2004 enlargement brought in the EU more low-wage and low-tax countries that tend further undermine, through competition, the welfare state model of big government and high taxes. In view of some political elites and in particular in view of the public in some old member states confronted with difficult economic and social circumstances, this competition from the new EU periphery amounts to "fiscal and social dumping", using low taxes and low wages levels to lure jobs and investment away from the economies of the old member states, shifting of factories and services to low cost locations in East-Central Europe. There is often also an associated view saying that the new member state governments in the periphery of the enlarged EU tend to balance their budgets by structural, regional and other funds from the EU budget.

Given these changes in the current core-periphery patterns and the associated public opinions, it is worthwhile to make a principal component analysis (see Rummel, 1970) of correlations between a number of general indicators varying across the old and new member states and describing the current economic and social situation in the EU25. Such a multivariate analysis is needed in order to specify in more exact socio-economic terms the current core-periphery differentiations. The outcomes of the analysis can be used in further statistical examination below.

Table 2 Two components of current economic situation in EU countries in 2003 and 2004 (no rotation; N = 25)

| Indicators | Loadings on component RICH WELFARE STATES 2003 – 2004 | Loadings on component GOVERNMENT DEBT AND DEFICIT 2004 |
|---|---|--|
| GDP per capita in 2003 (in PPS) | 0.796 | 0.221 |
| Total taxes in GDP in 2003 | 0.843 | -0.131 |
| Unemployment rate in October 2004 | -0.660 | -0.399 |
| Growth in GDP in 2003 (constant prices) | -0.794 | 0.362 |
| Government debt in 2004 (% of GDP) | 0.357 | -0.854 |
| Government surplus or deficit in 2004 (% of GDP) | 0.362 | 0.728 |

Extracted total variance: first component = 44.5 %; second component = 26.9 %. Statistical sources: Eurostat.

The results of the principal component analysis of six general indicators describing the current economic and social situation in the set of the twenty-five member states are presented in Table 1. It appears that the current economic and social situation in the EU can be represented as a two-dimensional pattern of two orthogonal components that already represent 71.4 percent of the total variance of the six indicators. The pattern is easy to interpret and no rotation of the dimensions is necessary. The first dimension can be called RICH WELFARE STATES 2003 – 2004 and represents 44.5 percent of the total variation. The loadings of the variables on the component clearly indicate that the dimension is consistent both in terms of its contents and statistically. On the one hand, the high positive loadings of GDP per capita 2003 (in purchasing parity standards) of 0.796 and share of total taxes in GDP in 2003 of 0.843 represent the association between the rich economies and their extensive tax base supporting the costs of advanced welfare states (Swank, 2002). On the other hand, there are significant negative loadings of unemployment rate in October 2004 (component loading -0.660) and GDP growth in 2003 (-0.794). Therefore, the empirical conclusion to be drawn is that the current rich welfare states tend to be confronted with lower unemployment rates, but also with low GDP growth. It is also interesting to note that the low positive loadings of government debt (0.357) and government surplus (0.362) in 2004 on this dimension indicate some association with difficult financial affairs of the national government. However, the differentiation in geographical patterns in these two indicators across the twenty-five member states is convincingly represented by the second dimension that can be called GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEFICIT AND DEBT 2004. This component represents 26.9 percent of the total variation and appears to be also bipolar. There is the high negative loading of government debt (-0.854) and the high positive loading of government surplus showing the systematic negative association of these two key indicators of financial affairs in the EU. Significantly, there also is a lower negative loading of the unemployment rate (-0.399) indicating the above-emphasised association between the structural socio-economic difficulties and difficult financial positions of the national governments concerned. There is also lower positive loading of growth in GDP in 2003 on this component indicating with little surprise that government surplus and lower deficit tend to be associated with economic growth. In brief, these consistent outcomes of the multivariate analysis enable to use the scores on the two components in further statistical examinations. It appears that the scores of the countries on the two dimensions can specify major core-periphery patterns in the current differentiation of the EU25.

Assessing in Figure 1 the pattern represented by the vertical and horizontal multivariate axes one can draw a number of preliminary conclusions. First, it is little surprising that none of the 10 new member countries score on the positive side of the vertical axis differentiating the rich countries from the poorer countries. However, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta are close to the average score line. Second, compositions of countries in the two upper parts of the scatter diagram indicated by the average lines on the dimensions do not represent a more or less clear core-periphery pattern. Figure 1 clearly shows that there is the grouping of countries that are rich welfare states and also score on the positive side of the second dimension (Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Ireland and the United Kingdom). Interestingly, to this most macro-economically successful group belong the three countries that are not a member of the European Monetary Union. Further, this group includes countries from the older EU core (Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) and also countries from the developed

periphery (Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland). Third, there is a grouping of rich welfare states that score on the negative side of the horizontal dimension and thus are currently confronted with difficult problems of low or no economic growth and government deficit and debt. It is important to note that the big EU countries belong to this group: Germany, France and Italy, accompanied by smaller member states Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands, and surprisingly also by peripheral Portugal. Belonging of Germany and France to this rich and currently less successful group in terms of economic performance is significant.




Figure 1 Scores on components RICH WELFARE STATES 2003 – 2004 and GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEFICIT AND DEBT 2004

The two large member states have been very influential players on all important issue of the European integration process (Rosemond, 2000; Dinan, 2000). Accordingly, the public opinion in these two key countries has always had important impacts the national political elites and on the affairs in the EU. Fourth, there is the part of the scatter diagram in Figure 1 in which there are less pour countries Spain, Slovenia and the Czech Republic that are not confronted with serious problems of government deficit and debt. However, there are small new member states from the Baltic region that currently experience considerable economic growth, but also high levels of unemployment rate. It

also appears that these countries can show currently better macroeconomic performance (see also Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2004). Fifth, there is the grouping of countries that are also poor, but which have also to confront serious financial problems of national governments. These countries are new member states from the EU periphery (Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus. Also peripheral Greece belongs to this grouping. Finally, the complex pattern of scores on the two dimensions shown in Figure 1 clearly documents that the 15 old member states cannot be grouped in terms of the historical core-periphery differences in accordance with the earlier stages of the EU enlargement (Preston, 1997). Only the new EU periphery brought in by the 2004 enlargement is indicated by negative scores on the vertical dimension of rich welfare states in a systematic way. Given the above-emphasised tensions concerning the importance of debates on socio-economic and financial affairs, it is worthwhile to examine these differences on the two dimensions in a larger explanatory context of the statistical analysis below.

2.3. Some issues in debate on the draft of EU constitution

According to the survey on the European Constitution by Eurobarometer number 62 (24,786 face to face interviews in EU25) based on fieldwork during 2-28 November 2004, a majority of 49 percent was in favour of the draft of European constitution. A minority of 16 percent opposed the draft and 35 percent did not know whether to be in favour or in opposition. However, these outcomes must be taken with caution because they are not based on an assessment of the contents of the draft EU constitution. It also appears that procedures of parliamentary ratification and referenda vary widely among the member states and this makes exchanges across national borders difficult (see Kurpas, Incerti and Schönlaue, 2005). Key players in the ratification debate are national governments and political parties, societal actors such as trade unions, business and employer groupings or religious organisations. Different actors were engaged in debates promoting their respective aims, but it appeared that the draft constitution was subject of national debates and not of a European cross-national exchange of assessments and views (Cerutti, 2005). An important point is that the draft constitution was a voluminous, difficult and unreadable text for outsiders. Another significant point is that opposing public opinion on the draft constitution seemingly tended to be formed by domestic socio-economic issues, especially when dissatisfaction with the national government seemed to be high and the electorate was then seizing the opportunity to present the bill the government.

Despite considerable diversity across the twenty-five member states, however, there were recurring issues in the debates. First, there was the clause allowing a member state to withdraw from the Union with eventual far-reaching consequences. This issue was in particular important in neutral and largely eurosceptic Austria and Sweden, and also in Denmark (Kurpas, Incerti and Schönlaue, 2005). In some other countries it was seen as a weaker point potentially decreasing the political cohesion of the enlarged EU. Ratification was seen as a condition for continuation of the EU membership. Second, there was the argument about geographical boundaries of Europe that was linked to the identity of the EU and seen as weakened by extensive enlargements, especially the one of 2004. Third, there was important debate on the role of the EU in the globalised world. On the one hand, there was the issue of developing common foreign and security policy. On the other hand, there was the problem of maintaining of so-called European social

model in the context of economic globalisation and competition. This debate was obviously concerned with the above-mentioned view of "fiscal and social dumping" and economic benefits resulting from the EU membership. The draft constitution was often seen as supporting a liberal restructuring of traditional welfare state model under pressures of "governance of globalisation" (Ceritti, 2005). Fourth, there were issues of efficiency and democracy of the EU. Opposing public opinion considered the draft constitution to be not enough in terms of boosting efficiency and weak in reducing well-known democratic deficit. Fifth, the proposed system of qualified majority voting continued to be sensitive issue (Kurpas, Incerti and Schönlaue, 2005; Jacobs, 2005). On the one hand, there were electorates that traditionally supported deeper integration (such as Italy, Germany, Belgium or Luxemburg). On the other, there was the public that usually wishes to maintain the current scope of confederal sovereignty in the EU using the veto right (such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Czech Republic or Slovakia). However, it must be reiterated again that the draft constitution would not change in a fundamental way the existing institutional balance of the confederal consociational system of the EU.

These issues can be placed in a larger setting of other structural problems and interstate patterns that characterise the functioning and articulations of interests of various groupings of the member states. The basic differentiations in the set of EU25 allow for the following assumptions that can further be used in the analysis of the opposing public opinion on the draft constitution. First, the historical core and the rich member states of the current EU can anticipate larger contributions to the EU budget in order to accommodate the development needs of the new member states. Basically, one can assume that the countries forming the historical core and indicated in Figure 1 by higher score on the vertical dimension of rich welfare states became all contributors to the EU budget and much less receipts or at least below-average receipts (see also Preston, 1997; Baldwin and Wypolysz, 2004). Second, these countries have been confronted with the need to restructure of the current Common Agricultural Policy. This has had significant impact on long-time established interests of agricultural sectors especially in the countries of the historical core. Third, the countries in the old EU periphery must expect a further restructuring of existing Structural and Cohesion Funds. The impact of the Iberian enlargement implied an important structural spending (see for an early discussion Baldwin et al., 1997). It can be expected that these members will demand in the EU financial programming special budget allocations in return for accepting further financial support for the new members. Fourth, under EU rules of the Treaty of Nice (December 2000), small countries are accorded far more votes per citizen than the larger ones. Clearly, the May 2004 enlargement brought pressures to change the EU rules and, not surprisingly, this has been leading to reorientations in budget priorities and new uncertainty about well-established financial distributions between countries, sectors and regions. Fourth, the public in the large old member states can be concerned about overall effectiveness of the EU if new member "micro-states" will have to assume the same level of EU organisational responsibilities as large states. Other concerns can focus on the power of blocking coalitions of small states to frustrate ambitions of the larger ones. Whichever assumption would be correct, the May 2004 enlargement inevitably changed budgetary interests of the basic groupings of the current EU member countries summarized in Figures 1. New and improving capacities for economic performance competition of new member states would be inclined to use their power as members to boost EU structural spending and try to change eligibility criteria. There is

no reason to assume that the new member states would be different from those of the two Mediterranean enlargements in 1980s. Finally, one may point out to fears in border regions of the EU countries having as neighbours the new member economies.

3. PUBLIC OPINION ON THE DRAFT OF CONSTITUTION

Figure 2 shows the differentiation in the opposition and the support to the draft of the EU constitution in November 2004 (Eurobarometer no. 62). First, it appears that the strong opposition was expressed in the public opinion in the UK of 30 percent and Scandinavian members Sweden, Denmark and Finland and in Austria of about 25 percent. A further conclusion to be drawn is that a high share of opposing opinion of 20 percent was in the Czech Republic, but also in France, Germany and Latvia and Poland the share was in November 2004 still above 15 percent. The lowest shares of opposing opinion on the draft constitution were in Ireland, Spain and Portugal; in consequence, in the member states of the old EU periphery that received decades-long substantial support from structural and regional funds and the cohesion fund (Bulmer and Lequesne, 2005; Baldwin and Wypolsz, 2004). Second, the difference between the public opinion in favour and in opposition to the draft indicates significant support in the member states of the historical core Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, but also in the new members Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia or Lithuania. This complex differentiation in the opposing and supporting public opinion in the set of twenty-five countries indicates that the necessary explanatory approach must be sufficiently complex in order to reach an acceptable level of the model determination.

Given the complexity of these tendencies in the differentiation in the public opinion opposing the draft constitution, it is necessary to use the wide lens of the multivariate LISREL (linear structural equations) analysis (see Saris and Stronkhorst, 1984). The LISREL approach is based on the postulation of an explanatory (causal) order of structural conditions such as population size, component scores on the two dimensions of the current socio-economic situation or number of years of the EU membership in the countries concerned and basic public opinion variables that seem to influence current opinions in the twenty-five polities. Thus, the role of a larger number of measures of structural conditions and intermediate variables on basic political opinion are examined as determinants of the public opinion opposing the draft of the EU constitution that is examined as the last dependent variable.

The causal order of the statistical examination explaining the differentiation in the shares of opposing opinion in the totals of samples (each about 1,000 respondents) in the twenty-five EU countries is conceptualised in three blocks (see Figure 4). First, there is a block of five structural conditions in the twenty-five countries that are used as independent variables explaining variation in dependent variables in the other two blocks. Second, there is a block of four intermediate variables representing basic orientations in the public opinion in the countries concerned. Third, there is the last dependent variable (OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004) indicating the differences across the twenty-five EU polities in their opposition towards the draft of the Treaty on European Constitution.




Figure 2 Opposition and support to draft EU constitution (November 2004)

3.1. Structural variables

The first structural variable to be examined in terms of its effects in the LISREL model is the population size (LOGPOP 2001). There have been claims underlying the importance of the population size expecting that the large EU members would not be more in favour of the draft constitution because the constitution would not sufficiently streamline the balance between the large and the smaller states and solve anticipated problems with so-called micro-states (Dinan, 2005; Alesina and Spolaore, 2005). Accordingly, the main hypothesis is that the population size measure would have a positive effect on the opposing votes. Given the enormous differences in population size, varying from tiny Luxembourg (0.4 million inhabitants) to reunited Germany (82 million inhabitants), the variable has been transformed in logarithms in order to obtain more normal distribution. Thus, the right tail with large population sizes is drawn in towards the mean, whereas the small sizes at the left of the distribution are moved away from the mean. This transformation implies that smaller population sizes will have stronger impacts in the overall distribution on this explanatory dimension. The second structural condition is variable EU YEARS indicating across the twenty-five countries the number of years of EU membership. The major hypothesis to be tested in the model is whether

the public opinion in the old member states is inclined to support more the draft constitution due to the long-lasting experience with the European integration process and with reforms of EU institutions and procedures, and successive incorporations of peripheral countries into the EU compact in the past, and with advantages and disadvantages of the post-war European integration in general (cf. Westle, 1995; Rosemond, 2000). Third and fourth structural conditions are the component scores on the measures RICH WELFARE STATES 2003-2004 and GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEBT AND DEFICIT 2004 (see Figures 1). It has been expected above that the two component measures can tend to have systematic effects on the public opinion variables.

3.2. Public opinion variables

Next, there is a block of four intermediate variables in the causal order of the model. In the above overview of the current core-periphery patterns there has been given emphasis to the importance of the changed economic, social and political positions of the EU countries in the context of globalisation (see also Dostál and Hampl, 2000). As it was already mentioned above, the draft constitution was frequently seen in some old member states as supporting a liberal restructuring of traditional welfare state model under pressures of "governance of globalisation" (Ceritti, 2005, 527). Of course, there is some relevance for this assessment. For instance, Swank argued that "(t)he importance of the political logic of globalisation is also illustrated by the degree to which international capital mobility (and trade competitiveness) is emphasised by the major social policy actors that contested the larger reforms of the German Sozialstaat" (2002, 185). Accordingly, it seems necessary to assess the role of the public opinion on the importance of globalisation pressures in the explanatory model. Special Eurobarometer No. 215 has provided specific information in the set of the EU25 on the public opinion concerning the Lisbon Agenda. The survey is also based on the fieldwork from November 2004 and organised as part of the Eurobarometer 62, on the opinion concerned with the globalisation and economic situation in the EU in respect to the national economic situation. Table 3 gives again the results of a principal component analysis. It shows the loadings of five answers specifying a consistent (unrotated) dimension representing differences in the public opinion given to the importance to globalisation across the EU25. There are clear positive loadings indicating the importance given to economic situation in the USA (0.856) and to the global economic situation (0.777) in respect to the national economy concerned. The importance given to economic situation in the whole EU in respect of the state of affairs in the national economy has a significant negative loading (-0.717). There is also a negative loading of the importance given to economic situation in neighbour countries (-0.665). A similar negative loading represents the opinion that the national economic situation is not depending on other countries (-0.571). It is clear that this component is statistically consistent (representing 52.3 percent of the total variation of the five indicators), and also in terms of the contents this dimension is very consistent. Therefore, the scores on this globalisation component can be used to represent the importance given to the globalisation in the public opinion of the EU25. The main hypothesis is that EU polities that score high on this dimension do not tend to oppose the draft, because they tend to assess the EU as an institutional tool that can ease pressures of globalisation on national economic situation. In the causal order of the model in Figure 4 this measure is called GLOBAL 2004.

Table 3 Importance given in public opinion to globalisation in November 2004 (component loadings)

| Indicators | Component loadings globalisation |
|--|----------------------------------|
| Economic situation in the USA | 0.856 |
| Global economic situation | 0.774 |
| Not depending on other countries | -0.571 |
| Economic situation neighbour countries | -0.665 |
| Economic situation in whole EU | -0.717 |
| Extracted variance = 52.3 percent | no rotation |

Source: Eurobarometer no. 62. 2004. European Commission. Brussels.

Since the beginning of public opinion analyse in the EU the advent of post-materialist value orientation has been central in debates and research on public opinion patterns and trends (Reif and Inglehart, 1991). Post-materialist value orientation has been widely seen as a major cause influencing other trends in political opinion of the EU public (Inglehart, 1997, 108ff). Basic claim on post-materialism argues that alongside of the coming of a post-industrial economy and advanced welfare state, a shift from materialist values orientation towards post-materialist values and preferences takes place and derives from the tension between the public concerns with economic growth, on the one hand, and the concerns with quality of life, such as environment, human rights or issues of peace (see also Dostál, 2002, 131-132). This mass value orientation is giving emphasis to self-expression values versus the traditional materialist value orientation stressing employment or pension policy (see also Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Given the great importance of this value orientation in the EU public opinion in extensive research and literature, the principal component shown in Table 3 attempts to substantiate the tension between post-materialism and materialism using available survey results from the Eurobarometer no. 62 collected in November 2004.

One can use as suitable indicators percentages of respondents who indicated three most important policy areas they thought the European Parliament has to concentrate on. Again, the principal component analysis has been employed in order to construct a common statistical dimension that represents the tension between post-materialist and materialist orientations of the public in individual EU countries and gives standardised scores for each country on the dimension (see Table 4). The nine policy areas selected in the survey appear to show across the twenty-five countries remarkable consistency.

Table 4 Post-materialist public opinion in November 2004 (component loadings)

| Indicators | Component loadings post-materialism |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Environment | 0.734 |
| Common foreign and security policy | 0.716 |
| Enlargement of EU | 0.795 |
| Immigration | 0.658 |
| Mobility of EU citizen | 0.570 |
| Agriculture | -0.398 |
| Education | -0.506 |
| Employment | -0.688 |
| Pensions | -0.906 |
| Extracted variance = 46.1 percent | no rotation |

Source: Eurobarometer no. 62. 2004. European Commission. Brussels.




Figure 3 Public opinion on globalisation and post-materialism (November 2004)

The first unrotated principal component shown in Table 3 represents 46.1 percent of the total variation of the nine indicators. The structure of component loadings shows clearly the assumed polarisation between post-materialist and materialist orientations. High positive loadings on the dimension have the stress on environment (0.734), concern with common foreign and security policy (0.716), enlargement (0.795), more free immigration (0.658) and mobility of EU citizens (0.570). On the materialist side of the dimension, there are high negative loadings of concerns with employment (-0.688), pensions (-0.906), education policy (-0.506) and agriculture (-0.398). Hence, the component score called POSTMAT 2004 on this dimension can be used to indicate differences in the post-materialist orientations across the twenty-five countries. Importantly, Figure 3 shows a close correlation (determination of 50,2 percent) between the components scores on the globalisation measure and the post-materialism measure. First, it is necessary to note that there can be expected a strong effect of the globalisation variable on the post-materialist measure in the causal order of the model. Second, it appears that in accordance with the outcomes of international world values surveys (see Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), the highest scores on the post-materialist dimension have Eurobarometer samples representing the electorates in Sweden,

Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. The most materialist positions are taken by Lithuania, Portugal, Greece, Slovakia or Latvia. The most post-materialist positions in the set of ten new member states are taken by the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Third variable in the intermediate block of public opinion variables represents a basic negative attitude towards the EU (Eurobarometer no. 62, question Q10.13 "Please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust the European Union?"). This opinion variable is the share of negative answers on the question (variable NO TRUST EU 2004). The highest negative scores are in Sweden (54%), Finland (50%), the United Kingdom (47%), Germany (42%) and the Netherlands (41%). The lowest scores are in Lithuania (15%), Ireland (20%), Portugal (22%), Hungary (22%) and Slovakia (24%). One can assume in the causal order of the explanatory model that the lack of trust in the EU membership will stimulate the negative opinion on the draft of EU constitution. The last explanatory public opinion variable is the support for enlargement (Eurobarometer 62, question 36.4: "Please tell me whether you are for future enlargement of the European Union to include other countries in future years"). The highest shares of positive answers are in Poland (78%), Lithuania (76%), Slovenia (75%), Slovakia (69%), Spain (67%) and the Czech Republic (66%). The lowest support for future enlargement is in Austria (28%), Germany (36%) Luxembourg (38%), France (39%), Denmark (43%) and Sweden (44%). This polarisation in public opinion shows the important cleavage between the rich welfare states and the poorer countries in the new periphery. The new member states are clearly in favour of future EU enlargements. It can be postulated that this opinion variable SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT 2004 will tend to have a systematic negative effect on the opposing opinion on the draft of EU constitution.

3.3. Explaining the opposing public opinion

These empirical measures representing the structural conditions and the public opinions and the associated hypotheses are thus translated into the causal model shown in Figure 4. The LISREL model procedure estimates independent direct and indirect, or mediated, effects in complex models with a large number of variables. The multiple regression of this model indicates that the four structural conditions and the four public opinion variables determine across the EU25 together 80 percent of the total variation of the variable OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004. In consequence, this high level of determination makes it possible to estimate the various effects in the model and interpret them in terms of causal relationships.

It appears that the four variables representing the structural conditions together determine 70 percent of the total variation of the GLOBAL scores (determination coefficient 0.70). As postulated above, the importance given to the global economic position of the countries concerned is significantly determined by the higher scores on the RICH WELFARE STATES dimension (effect 0.76). The effects are standardised regression coefficients, they are independent effects if all other variables are held in the postulated model statistically constant (see Saris and Stronkhorst, 1984). In the terms of the LISREL modelling this means that a shift of one standard deviation on this explanatory dimension implies a positive effect of 0.76 of standard deviation on the dependent measure GLOBAL. This high effect indicates that the electorates of the rich member states have long-term experience with globalisation pressures and recognise importance of the positions of their respective countries in the current pattern of

globalisation. Also the differences in the post-materialist value orientation scores are largely determined by the four structural variables and the GLOBAL measure (determination of 0.80 percent.). As there is also assumed above, the differences in the post-materialist orientation are effected by the RICH WELFARE STATES dimension (an effect of 0.29) that is representing the role of advance welfare state involvement and the importance of redistributive measures in the individual EU countries. This effect is in accordance with the suggestion of Inglehart (1997) saying that in democratic redistributive societies (i.e. advanced welfare states) the shift towards post-materialist values is considerable. However, the strong effect on the post-materialism measure is coming from the measure of globalisation (0.68). This is an important effect, because it shows that the polities giving importance to the post-materialism are seemingly also aware of global post-industrial society and current global patterns of associated culture map of the world (Inglehart and Wenzel, 2005, 57ff). The variable NO TRUST IN EU 2004 is representing the lack of faith in the EU and in the current European integration process in general. Also this measure has in the model a high level of determination (76 percent). It appears that the highest effect on this measure comes for the post-materialism dimension (0.57). Another significant effect has the globalisation variable (0.41). These two effects suggest that EU electorates having wider view of global patterns and cultural change in the era of globalisation tend to distrust the EU project. However, it is interesting to see that the structural variable EU YEARS is having a significant negative effect on the measure (-0.34). This effect indicates that the electorates in the older member states are inclined to assess the EU in positive terms due to the long-lasting experience with the European integration process. Finally, there is the last explanatory variable in the model that indicates the differences across the EU25 in support for future enlargement (determination of 72 percent). There are three interesting effects determining this variable. There is a significant negative effect (-0.48) coming from the rich welfare states measure. This result clearly shows that the polities of the richer member states do not tend to support future EU enlargements. It seems that the electorates of the member states with higher levels of GDP per capita tend to be concerned about their contributions to the EU budget needed for financing of the enlargement process. Next, there is an negative effect of the variable EU YEARS (-0.27). This lower effect suggests that the old member states are not more inclined to envisage new enlargement projects. There is also little surprising and expected negative effect (-0.36) coming from the variable expressing the lack of trust in the EU. This effect shows the tendency to reject a future widening of the recently enlarged EU.

Now closer attention can be directed to the right side of the causal model in Figure 4. As indicated above, the four structural conditions and the four intermediate variables statistically determine 80 percent of the total variation of the dependent variable OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004 in the set of 25 countries. The results summarised in Figure 4 and Table 4 show that the variable indicating the lack of trust in the EU plays a significant role in the model with a very high direct effect of 0.90. The outcomes of the model so far suggested this clear effect. However, the next strong effect is a negative one and comes from the globalisation measure (-0.52). This result would indicate that the EU electorates giving importance to globalisation also do not tend to oppose the draft of the EU constitution. Yet, there are in the model two significant indirect effects of the globalisation variable that allow another causal interpretation. First, there is a positive indirect effect mediated by the variable NO TRUST EU 2004: $0.41 \times 0.90 = 0.37$. Second, there is a positive mediated effect through the variables

POSTMAT 2004 and NO TRUST EU 2004: $0.68 \times 0.57 \times 0.90 = 0.35$. These two effects together ($0.37 + 0.35 = 0.72$) represent significant positive indirect effect. This outcome of the modelling means that if the public opinion is giving importance to the globalisation and simultaneously also to the post-materialist value orientation and is lacking trust in the EU project, then the global awareness of the electorates tends to oppose the deepening of the EU as expressed in the constitution draft. The direct positive effect of the post-materialist dimension on the dependent variable is lower (0.27). But, the indirect effect mediated by the variable lack of trust in the EU is considerable ($0.57 \times 0.90 = 0.51$). Similarly, if the post-materialist values are combined in the public opinion with the distrust of the EU project, then the electorates tend to oppose the attempted institutional deepening of the current EU. Next, there is a negative direct effect (-0.24) of the variable SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT 2004 on the dependent variable. There was a negative effect postulated in the model, but it is surprisingly low. Also the variable measuring the length of EU membership (EU YEARS) appears to be low (-0.22). However, the negative effect mediated by the variable NO TRUST EU 2004 is more significant ($-0.34 \times 0.90 = -0.31$). Indeed, it seems that the electorates having longer experience with the EU membership, tend to trust the EU and are less inclined to oppose the draft of EU constitution.




Figure 4 Opposing public opinion on the draft EU constitution in November 2004: a LISREL model

The other structural variables have even more dispersed and complicated indirect effects. Population size variable has a very low direct effect and no significant indirect effects. The dimension of RICH WELFARE STATES appears to have in the model only one significant and negative indirect effect through the globalisation measure ($-0.52 \times 0.76 = -0.39$). This means that the electorates in the richer member states, if realising the importance of the globalisation, do not tend to oppose the draft and are seemingly inclined to keep the possibility of a deepening of the EU alive and expect some positive role of the EU in the "governance of globalisation". The outcomes of the model also indicate the lack of any significant independent effect of the measure SURPLUS OR DEBT 2004. This is certainly surprising and this result means that the differentiation in the financial affairs in the set of the EU25 does not tend to have some systematic impacts on the various directions of the public opinion in the current EU electorates.

Table 5 Direct effects of explanatory variables on opposing opinion on the draft of EU constitution (OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004)

| Explanatory variables | Direct effects |
|----------------------------------|----------------|
| No trust EU 2004 | 0.90 |
| Global 2004 | -0.52 |
| Postmat 2004 | 0.27 |
| Support enlargement 2004 | -0.24 |
| EU years | -0.22 |
| Log pop 2001 | 0.20 |
| Rich welfare states 2003-4 | -0.08 |
| Surplus or deficit and dept 2004 | 0.01 |

4. CONCLUSIONS

There is the difficult question asked in this paper on "quo vadis European Union"? The conclusion can be drawn that the constitution project was an attempt to consolidate the current stage of the deepening of the European integration process. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums held in France and the Netherlands in 2005 seems to indicate the end of a long cycle of attempts to deepen the European integration that started in its first stage with the Single Market Act (1985) and the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). However, there emerged considerable uncertainty in 2004 – 2005 about the future of the integration process. Approaching the EU in terms of the confederal consociation system allows for a realistic interpretation of the current state of affairs in the EU. Systematic analyses of the public opinion following this interpretation make clear that the European polity is still largely fragmented by cleavages among the twenty-five electorates. Public opinion and mass interest articulations of the national polities are central to studies on the European integration process because they can highlight emerging uncertainties about the nature of the European integration process. The interpretation of the current stage of the integration process through the lens of the public opinion in the set of twenty-five countries of the enlarged EU provides a feedback showing barrier effects that tend to come from the electorates to the governing political elites of the member states.

The statistical analysis of the November 2004 articulations of the public opinion opposing the draft of EU constitution has shown (i) the importance of both opinions on globalisation and the post-materialist value orientation, and (ii) the significance of the lack of trust in the EU. The outcomes of the statistical examination have made clear that in the set of the twenty-five EU countries there is the positive effect of post-materialist values orientation on the public opinion opposing the draft of the European constitutional treaty. There are also significant indirect positive effects of the public opinion giving importance to the globalisation on the opinion opposing the draft of the EU constitution. The differentiation according to the measure RICH WELFARE STATES describes the basic core-periphery patterns in the EU. However, this variable tends to have only a weak indirect negative effect on the last dependent variable. This surprising result means that the current core-periphery patterns of socio-economic disparities across the EU25 do not seem to be at the inter-state level crucial conditions in current articulations of public interests in the old member states and the new member states in the periphery of the EU. The current major socio-economic cleavages in the enlarged EU do not seem to be reflected in the public opinion on the EU deepening in a systematic way. The multivariate analysis confirms the hypothesis that the electorates of richer EU countries tend to give importance both to the globalisation and the post-materialism. Longer membership in the EU seems to result in decreasing opposition of national electorates to the proposed new institutionalisation of the confederal consociation of the Union as expressed in the constitution draft. It is also important to emphasise that the electorates of new member states tend to support future enlargements of the EU25.

However, the crucial conclusion to be drawn in this paper is that a strong and integrative sense of a larger European community based on "mutual sympathies and loyalty; of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration" as envisaged by Deutsch et al. (1957, 36) and some other observers of unifying and fragmenting tendencies in Europe (Sinnott, 1995; Westle, 1995, or Emerson, 1997), still has to emerge in the public opinion of the enlarged European Union. The unsuccessful ratification process in some of the 25 member states can lead to an alternative that can significantly redraw the map of the European integration process. There can emerge a political process turning inwards in a smaller number of member states: the creation of a hard core of some states with political elites believing in closer integration. Such a political process is already represented by the creation of the inner circle of the euro-zone. This trajectory of the future European integration process would imply that the EU would be formed by an inner group and a wider group of member states would stay in the periphery of the confederal consociational system of the twenty-five states.

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Quo vadis Evropská unie? Jádru, periferie a veřejné mínění

Resume

Příspěvek je věnován analýze veřejného mínění v rozšířené Evropské unii (EU) o konceptu Smlouvy o evropské ústavě (SEU). Projekt SEU byl pokus konsolidovat současnou fázi prohlubování procesu evropské integrace. Rozbor veřejného mínění a masové artikulace zájmů politických národů rozšířené EU25 přispívají k pochopení charakteru procesu evropské integrace. Interpretace EU je v tomto příspěvku založena na konceptu EU jako konfederálního konsociálního systému, který postrádá integrovaný nadnárodní politickou komunitu. Odmítnutí SEU ve referendech ve Francii a Nizozemsku v květnu a červnu 2005 zřejmě ukazuje konec dlouhodobého cyklu pokusů o prohlubování evropské integrace, který začal svou první fází s Jednotným evropským aktem (1986) a Maastrichtskou smlouvou (1992). Avšak v letech 2004 – 2005 se objevily vážné pochyby o dostatečné podpoře pro další prohlubování a rozšiřování EU. Interpretace EU jako konfederálního konsociálního systému umožňuje realistický výklad současného stavu. Systematické rozbor veřejného mínění jasně ukazují, že významně sjednocená nadnárodní politická komunita EU25 ještě nevznikla, a že je stále významně diferencována politickými rozhraními politických národů členských zemí. Hodnocení současného stavu integračního procesu s pomocí rozborů veřejného mínění v souboru 25 zemí rozšířené EU poskytuje informaci o možných politických zpětných vazbách a ukazuje bariéry mezi voliči a politickými elitami členských zemí v kontextu současné diferenciaci makroekonomických a jiných strukturálních podmínek mezi členskými zeměmi.

Komponentní analýza korelací základních ukazatelů diferenciaci makroekonomické situace v souboru zemí EU25 dokumentuje význam dvou dimenzí a strukturálních vztahů mezi jádrem a periferiemi rozšířené EU. První dimenze reprezentuje hlavně diferenciaci mezi bohatými sociálními státy a novou periferií (viz tab. 1 a obr. 1). Ekonomiky členských zemí nové periferie realizují vyšší úroveň růstu HDP. Druhá dimenze reprezentuje korelace mezi zadlužením státu a státním deficitem. V debatách o podpoře nebo opozici k SEU hrály v zemích EU25 významnou roli vnímané rozdíly v současné makroekonomické situaci členských zemí. Proto jsou tyto dvě diferenciaci zahrnuty v tomto příspěvku do rozboru diferenciaci negativního mínění o SEU (viz proměnná OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004). Rozbor je založen na výstupech Eurobarometru z listopadu 2004, které publikovala Evropská komise (Eurobarometer 62.1). Explanace rozdílů negativního mínění o SEU v souboru 25 zemí EU je provedena s pomocí multi variační metody LISREL (soustava standardizovaných regresních rovnic). Modelování LISREL umožňuje konstrukci explanačního systému, který má dvě skupiny proměnných: čtyři strukturální proměnné a pět proměnných, které ukazují diferenciaci v základních hodnotových a politických orientacích ve veřejném mínění. Strukturální ukazatele zahrnují populační velikost (logaritmicke transformovaná proměnná LOGPOP2001), počet let členství země v EU (EUYEARS), a komponentní skóre zemí na obou dimenzích současné makroekonomické situace (viz RICH WELFARE STATES 2003-2004 a GOVERNMENT SURPLUS OR DEBT AND DEFICIT 2004). Pomocí komponentních analýz korelací odpovídí o významu globalizace pro ekonomickou situaci země (viz tabulka 2 a proměnná GLOBAL 2004) a o post-materialistické hodnotové orientaci (viz tabulka 3 a proměnná POSTMAT 2004) jsou s pomocí komponentních skóre zahrnuty do modelu tyto základní hodnotové a politické orientace (viz také obrázek 2). Další dvě proměnné reprezentují diferenciaci v odpovědích na pouze jednu otázku: úroveň nedůvěry v EU (viz proměnná NO TRUST EU 2004) a podpora pro budoucí rozšiřování EU (viz proměnná SUPPORT ENLARGEMENT 2004). První z těchto dvou indikátorů naznačuje neochotu podporovat

další prohlubování EU. Druhý ukazuje diferenciaci v podpoře dalšího rozšiřování EU25.

Komplexní explanační model dosahuje vysoké úrovně determinace poslední závislé proměnné OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004 (statistická determinace 80%). Standardizované regresní koeficienty specifikují v postulovaném modelu několik důležitých kauzálních tendencí (viz obrázek 4). Předně je nutné jmenovat vysoký pozitivní efekt skóre na dimenzi bohatých sociálních států na skóre na dimenzi významu globalizace (efekt 0,76). Tento efekt dokumentuje, že veřejné mínění v bohatých státech EU25 uznává význam globální pozice národní ekonomiky ve vztahu k její současné prosperitě. Model dále dokládá, že také veřejné mínění v populačně větších zemích EU má větší tendenci přikládat globalizaci větší význam (viz pozitivní efekt 0,31). Explanační model rovněž ukazuje důležitý vztah mezi důrazem na globalizaci a post-materialistickou hodnotovou orientaci veřejného mínění (pozitivní efekt 0,68). Tento vztah naznačuje, že přisuzování významu globalizaci je svázáno z odklonem od materialistických hodnot a příklonem k hodnotám post-moderní éry vývoje. Následující důležitý výsledek tohoto modelování ukazují efekty těchto dvou proměnných na diferenciaci v nedůvěře v EU (viz proměnná NO TRUST EU 2004). Skóre na post-materialistické dimenzi má významný pozitivní efekt (0,57) a též skóre na komponentě globalizace ukazuje značný efekt (0,41), který je ještě posílen zprostředkovaným efektem přes skóre post-materialismu ($0,68 \times 0,57 = 0,39$; $0,39 + 0,41 = 0,80$). Tyto efekty dokumentují skutečnost, že obě názorové a hodnotové orientace mají významný vliv na diferenciaci v nedůvěře v rozšířené EU ve své kombinaci. Nedůvěra v EU je obzvláště vysoká v zemích, ve kterých je dáván ve veřejném mínění důraz na význam globalizace a současně na post-materialistické hodnoty. Efekty strukturálních proměnných dále naznačují, že populační velikost země má tendenci tuto nedůvěru zvyšovat (viz efekt 0,29) a naopak délka členství snižovat (efekt -0,34). Tyto efekty strukturálních indikátorů ukazují, že veřejné mínění v menších a starších členských zemích má tendenci méně nedůvěřovat EU. Také efekty strukturálních a ostatních proměnných na diferenciaci v podpoře rozšiřování jsou komplexní. Veřejné mínění v bohatých členských zemích ukazuje tendenci nepodporovat rozšíření (viz efekt -0,48). Podobný efekt má délka členství v EU (efekt -0,27). Významný negativní efekt má rovněž diferenciaci v nedůvěře v EU (-0,36). Tyto efekty jasně reprezentují současné tendence ve veřejném mínění politických národů EU nepodporovat další rozšiřování EU25. Konečně explanační diferenciaci v hlavní závislé proměnné OPPOSED EU CONSTITUTION 2004 ukazuje výhody použitého komplexního modelování kauzálních řetězců specifikovaných efektů. Přímé efekty (viz tabulka 4) jasně ukazují důležitost efektu nedůvěry v EU (viz vysoký pozitivní efekt 0,90). Další přímý pozitivní efekt ukazuje post-materialistická orientace (0,27) a populační velikost (0,20). Avšak nepřímý pozitivní efekt post-materialismu kombinovaný s nedůvěrou v EU ($0,57 \times 0,90 = 0,51$) je velice významný a naznačuje klíčovou kauzální pozici této hodnotové orientace v explanaci diferenciaci v odmítání SEU ($0,27 + 0,51 = 0,78$). Zajímavé jsou také efekty skóre na dimenzi významu globalizace. Přímý efekt je jasně negativní (-0,52). Avšak nepřímé efekty kombinované s post-materialismem a nedůvěrou v EU jsou pozitivní a naznačují vliv na odmítání SEU ($0,41 \times 0,90 = 0,37$; $0,68 \times 0,27 = 0,18$). Diferenciaci v podpoře rozšiřování má očekávaný nižší negativní efekt (-0,24). Přímé efekty strukturálních indikátorů jsou nízké (viz délka členství v EU: -0,22; populační velikost (0,20) anebo zanedbatelné. Avšak kombinovaný negativní efekt skóre na dimenzi bohatých sociálních států a skóre na dimenzi významu globalizace je významný: $-0,51 \times 0,76 = -0,39$. Tento výsledek explanačního modelování naznačuje, že v EU25 existuje tendence ve veřejném mínění bohatých členských států neodmítat SEU, když je globalizaci a jejím tlakům na národní ekonomiku přisuzován větší význam.

Avšak i tyto výsledky nenaznačují, že současná sociálně-ekonomická rozhraní v diferenciaci centrum – periferie v EU25 představují nejdůležitější explanační rozdíly v rozšířené EU. Postulovaný model ukazuje, že veřejné mínění o významu globalizace a post-materialistické hodnotové orientace se ukazují jako klíčové explanační faktory, které vysvětlují rozdíly v negativním mínění o SEU. Významné rozdíly ve směrech a úrovních veřejného mínění o prohlubování a rozšiřování v současné EU dokumentují existující fragmentaci ve formování nadnárodní identity. Právě formování nadnárodní identity by mělo nést politické procesy evropské integrace dále. Neúspěšný ratifikační proces SEU tyto rozdíly dokumentuje. Rozbory veřejného mínění v souboru 25 zemí a interpretace EU jako konfederální konsociální systém národních států, jejich politických elit a politických národů umožňuje tyto tendence posoudit realisticky.